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THE ESSENTIAL FLAW IN THE GLOBALISATION OF
CAPITAL MARKETS: ITS IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Ross P. BUCKLEY*
The global economy has changed profoundly in the past thirty years. In
1970, the capital that moved around the globe to support the trade in goods
and services far exceeded the capital that moved to support both direct and
portfolio investment. Today, capital flows outweigh trade flows by a factor
of over sixty-to-one. I Indeed, today "the debt flows to the emerging markets
are going to... come from... pension funds and mutual funds,. . . not from
bank balance sheets."2 Today, institutional investors have assumed a central
role in international capital flows.'
Globalisation is all about the convergence of markets. It has found its
fullest expression in international financial markets4 due to the ease with
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1. Peter D. Sutherland, Managing the International Economy in an Age of Globalisation,
Remarks at the 1998 Per Jacobsson Lecture, the annual meeting of the IMF and the World
Bank (Oct. 4, 1998), available at http://www.odc.org/commentary/pdsjacobsson.htnl (last
visited Oct. 5, 2001). As Sebastian Edwards has indicated, "Economists have long recognized
that cross-border capital movements pose a difficult policy issue. In the absence of strong fi-
nancial supervision in either lending or borrowing countries, unregulated capital flows
may... be misallocated .... generating waves of major disruptions in the receiving nations."
SEBASTIAN EDWARDS, How EFFECTIVE ARE CAPITAL CONTROLS? 25 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 7413, 1999) available at http://www.nber.org/ papers/w7413.
2. Mitchell Martin, Wall Street Sees Red at U.S. Plan for Bondholders to Accept More
Risk, INT'L HERALD TRm., Apr. 26, 1999, at 16 (quoting Charles Dallara, Managing Editor of
the Institute of International Finance).
3. The rise in influence of mutual funds began in the early to mid-1990s when commen-
tators noted "a new phenomenon in Latin America where mutual fund managers-not bank-
ers-can bring an economy to its knees." Kevin G. Hall, Latin America Economies Vulner-
able to Uninformed Investing Decisions, J. OF CoM., Apr. 28, 1995, at 3A.
4. Sutherland, supra note 1, at 2; JOSEPH A. CAMILLERI & JIM FALK, THE END OF
SOVEREIGNTY 77-78 (1992); Juan Ayuso & Roberto Blanco, Has Financial Market Integration
Increased During the 1990s?, Presentation at a conference of the Bank for International Set-
tlements: "International Financial Markets and the Implications for Monetary and Financial
Stability" (Oct. 25-26, 1999), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/confer08.htm.
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which capital moves around the globe. In today's world, money is moved by
strokes on a keyboard in response to information on computer screens.'
Globalisation is a product of the computer and communications revolutions,
the growth in multinational enterprises, the tremendous increase in interna-
tional institutional investment, and the international victory of free market
capitalism in the battle of ideologies and the associated reductions in na-
tional barriers to trade and capital.6 While these elements of globalisation are
relatively new, globalisation is not a new phenomenon. The Roman Empire
was the most important force for globalisation the world had seen,7 and,
more recently, financial globalisation was so strong in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries that, on some measures, the scale of interna-
tional capital flows relative to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are still to be
repeated.8
Globalisation is a broad church, a process with many facets. This article
addresses the impact of globalisation on capital markets and the impact of
globalised capital markets on human rights in developing countries.
5. Globalisation has been defined as "the increasing tendency toward an interconnected
worldwide investment and business environment." Investorwords investing glossary, at
http://www.investorwords.com.html; and "the tendency toward a worldwide investment envi-
ronment, and the integration of national capital markets." Yahoo Finance Financial Glossary
at http:/Ibiz.yahoo.com/f/gfbfglosg.html.
6. John H. Farrar, The New Financial Architecture and Effective Corporate Governance,
33 INT'L LAW. 927, 931 (1999).
7. John Braithwaite, Sovereignty and Globalisation of Business Regulation, in TREATY-
MAKING AND AUSTRALIA 115, 119 (Alston & Chiam eds., 1995); JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER
DRAHOS, GLOBAL BusINEss REGULATION 40-45 (2000).
8. The net capital outflow from the UK before 1914 peaked at some 9% of GNP and the
proportion was almost as high for France, Germany and Holland, the other major creditor
countries. These proportions have not been achieved since. Likewise, current account deficits
of the principal capital importing countries, Argentina, Australia and Canada, were over 10%
for long periods. These levels have only been achieved by developing countries for short pe-
riods, which typically have been followed by very difficult adjustments. Barry Eichengreen &
Michael Mussa, Capital Account Liberalization: Theoretical and Practical Aspects, 35(4)
FIN. & DEV., Dec. 1998, (IMF Occasional Paper No 172) at 31, available at
http://www.imf.org/externa/pubs/ft/fandd/1998/12/eichen.htm. While net capital flows rela-
tive to GDP were, if anything, higher pre-1914 than today, gross flows are much higher today.
Furthermore, investment pre-1914 was overwhelmingly in the bonds of governments, rail-
ways, mining companies and public utilities. Some 85% of overseas portfolio investment was
in the bonds of governments (that can raise taxes) or industries with substantial tangible and
transparent assets. This was a rational choice of investment target given the relatively poor
information available. Id. at 32-34.
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I. THE GLOBALISATION OF CAPITAL MARKETS
The globalisation of capital markets includes the following phenomena
and trends:9
1. Massive Capital Flows: Massive capital flows are a fact of life
and foreign investors, in particular, are opportunists." Foreign inves-
tors quickly move money into an economy in large quantities" and
quickly remove it at the first sight of gathering storm clouds (Mexico
in late 1994, Asia in 1997, and Russia in 1998).'
2. Investor Behavior: The nature and management of investors
changed radically in the 1990s. The proportion of capital controlled
by the large institutional investors (mutual funds, pension funds, and
insurance companies) increased dramatically. 3 Hedge funds brought
aggressive new investment techniques to bear.' More significantly,
but with less publicity, virtually all major commercial and investment
banks and securities firms established departments that functioned as
hedge funds. 5 These funds make extensive use of leverage and deriva-
tives as well as the capacity to move in to and out of markets swiftly.
Indeed, the entire money management sector has become far more
performance-driven, less risk-averse and more inclined to use lever-
age heavily. 6
3. Access to Information: Access to up to the minute information
facilitates investment decisions at great distances, while supplying
9. The following factors owe much to Henry Kaufman, Protecting against the next fi-
nancial crisis: the need to reform global financial oversight, the IMF, and monetary policy
goals, 34 Bus. EcoN. 56 (1999).
10. Gerhard Aschinger, Why Do Currency Crises Arise and How Could They be
Avoided?, 36(3) INTERECONOMICS 152, 153-54 (2001).
11. From 1992 until the Mexican crisis, capital inflows into Mexico were at 7% of GDP.
SEBASTIAN EDWARDS & MIGUEL A. SAVASTANO, THE MORNING AFTER: THE MEXICAN PESO IN
THE AFrERMATH OF THE 1994 CURRENCY CRISIS 13 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 6516, 1998) available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6516. Indonesia, Korea and
Thailand were recipients of capital inflows prior to 1997, which in Thailand reached 15.5% of
its GDP from 1994-1996. Joseph Joyce, The IMF and Global Financial Crises 43(4)
CHALLENGE 88, 93 (2000).
12. See Joyce, supra note 11, at 88. At the beginning of the Mexico crisis the Bank of
Mexico lost US $4 billion of reserves in one day after authorities announced a 15% rise in the
exchange rate ceiling without other macroeconomic policy changes. EDWARDS, supra note 11
at 13.
13. For instance, U.S. mutual funds assets increased over four times between 1990 and
1997 from US $1,067 billion to US $4,490 billion. U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 533 (118th ed. 1998).
14. Claire Makin, Doesn't Anybody Remember Risk? INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr.
1994, at 41.
15. Id.
16. As Makin wrote in 1994: "Strategies once deemed to be on the wilder, forbidden
shores of the business are being eagerly embraced by mainline institutional investors." Id. at
41.
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foreign investors with relatively homogenised information. 7 Before
the communications revolution, long-term investment was often the
only sensible approach to foreign investment. Today, however, an in-
vestment portfolio in Brazil can be managed as aggressively and in-
tensively as if it were a portfolio in one's own country, yet the sources
of information upon which investment decisions will be based are far
less diverse than if it was in one's own country, with predictable
consequences for investor behaviour.
4. Hedging Risks: Modem financial derivatives provide tremen-
dous opportunities for hedging risks, but are perhaps more often used
to facilitate speculation and as integral elements of volatility inducing
activities. 8 Certainly "an increased use of derivatives leads to higher
cross-border capital flows.., thus leading to a rise in the asymmetry
of information and therefore, a rise in financial volatility."'9
5. Myth of Liquidity: In contemporary capital markets with effi-
cient depositary and settlement systems, liquidity can be temptingly
easy to believe in. 'If it trades like a global bond and settles like a
global bond it must have the other characteristics of a global bond.'
Capital markets that are deep and efficient in good times can rapidly
become thin and illiquid in bad times. This is especially true of secon-
dary markets in debt and access to new money through debt issues.2"
6. Integrated Markets: Due to the above factors, capital markets
in the debt and equity of developed and developing nations are inte-
grated and interdependent today to an unprecedented degree.2
Each of these aspects of globalisation tends to increase the volume of
portfolio capital flows to emerging market nations and the volatility of such
flows.2" Indeed, there is considerable evidence that the globalisation of fi-
nancial markets increases the volatility of such markets.23
The globalisation of capital markets gives countries access to new
sources of capital, and capital drives economic growth." This is globalisa-
17. Aschinger, supra note 10, at 153.
18. See id.
19. PABLO BuSTELO ET AL., GLOBAL AND DOMESTIC FACTORS OF FINANCIAL CRISES IN
EMERGING ECONOMIES: LESSONS FROM THE EAST ASIAN EPISODES (1997-1999) 72 (ICEI
Working Paper No. 16, 1999) available at http://www.ucm.es/info/icei.
20. See generally Ross P. Buckley, Emerging Markets Debt: An Analysis of the Secon-
dary Market, KLUWER LAW INT'L (1999).
21. Ayuso, supra note 4, at 193. For instance, Russia's economic troubles in August
1998 sent yields on the U.S. long bond to unprecedented lows and affected even U.S. munici-
pal bonds. Jeremy Grant & John Labate, Investors Seek Safety in Bonds, FIN. TIMES (London),
Aug. 22, 1998, at 8.
22. Aschinger, supra note 10, at 153.
23. Ayuso, supra note 4, at 182; BUSTELO ETAL., supra note 19, at 68.
24. Robert G. King & Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right,
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Aug. 1993, at 717; Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock
Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth, AM. ECON. REV., June 1998, at 537.
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tion's great attraction. However, as the international debt crisis that erupted
in 1982, and the more recent currency and financial crises in Mexico, Asia
and Russia have demonstrated, generous access to foreign capital is often far
from a good thing for developing countries. Mexico's crisis at the end of
1994 arose largely from a fixed25 and overvalued exchange rate.26 Choosing
to devalue one's currency is often difficult for politicians as it risks inflation
and may well be seen domestically as evidence of a failure in economic
leadership. It is no coincidence that Mexico's national election and peso cri-
sis were close in time:27 a government about to face the electorate failed to
make the tough but necessary decisions, and preferred, very humanly, to
hope that a change in economic conditions might intervene to avert a crisis.28
The Asian Economic Crisis that erupted in Thailand in mid-1997 and
proceeded to spread throughout East Asia had exchange rate elements to it,29
but was far more of an economic crisis." It was a crisis brought on by exces-
25. Mexico used this as the basis for the Pacto de Solidaridad, the exchange rate-based
stabilization program that was implemented in full force in 1988. PEDRO ASPE, ECONOMIC
TRANSFORMATION THE MEXICAN WAY 49; SEBASTIAN EDWARDS, ON CRISIS PREVENTION:
LESSONS FROM MEXICO AND EAST ASIA 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 7233, July 1999) available at http://www.nber.orglpapers/w7233.
26. Before the crisis some believed the peso would require a 20-30% devaluation to
reach equilibrium. A year after the peg was abandoned, it had lost almost one half of its value.
EDWARDS & SAVASTANO, supra note 11, at 7. See also SEBASTIAN EDWARDS, A TALE OF TWO
CRISES: CHILE AND MEXICO 13 (Nat'l Burea of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6516,
1998) available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6516; Jeffrey D. Sachs, Aaron Tornell &
Andres Velasco, Financial Crises in Emerging Markets: The Lessons of 1995,1 BROOKING
PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 147, at Table 9 (1996); Aschinger, supra note 10, at 156-57.
27. Indeed President Zedillo was sworn into office on December 1, and on December 20
the authorities lifted the ceiling of the exchange rate band by 15%. EDWARDS & SAVASTANO,
supra note 11, at 13.
28. In fact, the Mexican politicians claimed their nation was experiencing the 'best of
times.' EDWARDS, supra note 26, at 2. Further, NAFTA had just been signed and Mexico was
about to join the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Id. at 6;
Aschinger, supra note 10, at 156-57.
29. EDWARDS, supra note 26, at 5. Intense speculation by hedge funds and others, betting
that fixed exchange rates would be allowed to float, and fall, was the trigger for the crisis, but
not its cause. This speculation was effected by selling East Asian currencies short (i.e. enter-
ing into a contract to sell a currency in the future that you presently don't hold, in anticipation
of being able to buy it in the market at a cheaper price when it is required to close out the con-
tract). The speculators, at most, affected the timing, and perhaps the severity of the loss of
confidence in the region. Id.
30. However, not a traditional economic crisis brought about by poor fiscal and monetary
discipline. In the words of Laurence Meyer, a member of the Board of Governors of the US
Federal Reserve System,
By conventional standards, the monetary and fiscal policies of the developing
Asian economies prior to the crisis were largely disciplined and appropriate....
Consumer price inflation.., was relatively subdued [and] fiscal policy also ap-
pears to have been disciplined.... Therefore, another important lesson of the
Asian crisis is that sound macroeconomic policies alone do not preclude crises.
LAURENCE H. MEYER, LESSONS FROM THE ASIAN CRISIS: A CENTRAL BANKER'S PERSPECTIVE
5 (Levy Econ. Institute, Working Paper No. 276, 1999).
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sive borrowing and lending,3' inefficient domestic financial sectors,32 crony
capitalism,33 and a loss of confidence in the region by foreign investors3" and
creditors.33 The depreciation of the yen beginning in mid-1995 provided a
further twist in the Asian context. As the 1990s progressed, East Asian
economies began moving increasingly into the high-tech exports market,
where they were forced to compete with Japan. However their exchange
rates were, for the most part, pegged to an appreciating US dollar 6 while,
from mid-1995 onwards, their principal competitor enjoyed a depreciating
currency.37
Russia's economic crisis had a genesis all its own. It was the product of
the collapse of the political, economic and governmental systems of that na-
tion.38 This collapse was associated with the country's move from centuries
of feudal and then communist rule to a free enterprise system in which tax
collection proved to be an almost insurmountable hurdle,39 and the rule of
31. MANUEL F. MONTES, THE CURRENCY CRISIS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 12-15(1998); see
GIANCARLO CORSETFI ET AL., WHAT CAUSED THE ASIAN CURRENCY CRISIS? PART I: A
MACROECONOMIC OvERviEw 28 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6833,
1998); GIANCARLO CORSETTI ET AL., WHAT CAUSED THE ASIAN CURRENCY CRISIS? PART II:
THE POLICY DEBATE 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6834, 1998);
ASIA'S FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, EFFECTS AND AFTERSHOCKS, UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL
ISSUES 4-5 (Richard Buckley ed., 1998) [hereinafter Asia's Financial Crisis]. See also Jared
Levinson, "Living Dangerously": Indonesia and the Reality of the Global Economic System,
7 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 425, 437-41 (1998) (analysis of the contribution to the crisis of impru-
dent lending by the IMF and World Bank).
32. Gregory W. Noble & John Ravenhill, Causes and Consequences of the Asian Finan-
cial Crisis, in THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 1, 2-4 (Gregory W. Noble & John Ravenhill, eds.,
2000); MARCUS NOLAND ET AL., GLOBAL ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE ASIAN CURRENCY
DEVALUATIONS 3 (Institute for International Economics, Policy Analyses in International
Economics No. 56, 1998); Aschinger, supra note 10, at 157.
33. See Levinson, supra note 31, at 431-37 (analyzing of the role "crony capitalism"
played in the crisis in Indonesia, the country where it is most highly developed).
34. Noble & Ravenhill, supra note 32, at 2; CORSETI ET AL., supra note 31, at 1.
35. Ross P. Buckley, An Oft-Ignored Perspective on the Asian Economic Crisis: The
Role of Creditors and Investors, 15 BANK. & FIN. L. REv. 431, 441-42 (2000); Ross P. Buck-
ley, Six Lessons for Banking Regulators from the Asian Economic Crisis, in PERSPECTIVES ON
BANKING, FINANCE & CREDIT LAW 51, 60 (Wickrema Weerasooria ed., 1999).
36. MONTES, supra note 31, at xiii; Noble & Ravenhill, supra note 32, at 5-6; EDWARDS,
supra note 25, at 5; Aschinger, supra note 10, at 156-57. Pre-crisis 1990's Thailand had a peg
of 25.2 to 25.6 baht to the US dollar. Malaysia maintained a 10% band of 2.5 to 2.7 ringgit to
the US dollar. The Philippines' peg was fixed at 26.2 peso to the US dollar after 1995, previ-
ously moving in a 15% band of 24 to 28 peso to the US dollar. And Indonesia had a crawling
peg, which began at 1,900 rupiah to the US dollar in 1990 and moved to 2,400 rupiah to the
US dollar in 1997. NOLAND ET AL., supra note 32, at 5 n.10.
37. EAST ASIA ANALYTICAL UNIT, DEPT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE,
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, ASIA'S FINANCIAL MARKETS: CAPITALISING ON REFORM 22
(1999); CORSETTI ET AL., supra note 31, at 14; NOLAND ET AL., supra note 32 at 5; EDWARDS,
supra note 25, at 5.
38. Asia's Financial Crisis, supra note 31, at 14-15.
39. OLIVER BLANCHARD & ANDREI SHLEIFER, FEDERALISM WITH AND WITHOUT POLITICAL
CENTRALIZATION: CHINA VERSUS RUSSIA 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 7616, 2000).
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law failed badly.' Global capital did however worsen the eventual collapse
in Russia in August of 1998 by flooding into the nation throughout 1997 and
in the first several months of 1998.1 Capital flowed there in reliance on Rus-
sia's geo-political significance ensuring an International Monetary Fund
(IMF) bail-out of creditors.' However, the IMF Would not lend in to an eco-
nomic policy vacuum and hopefully had learned a lesson from the preceding
year with the bailouts of Indonesia, Thailand and Korea. These bailouts led
to precisely the moral hazard of investors and creditors sending money into
Russia, not in the expectation that it would be repaid by Russia (once the in-
terest rate on Russian government short-term debt instruments reached levels
as high as fifty to sixty percent in mid-1998, repayment was clearly impossi-
ble), but solely in the expectation that the loans would be repaid by an IMF-
led bailout.43
A slick intellectual trick is often perpetrated here. Free trade in goods
and services is generally accepted among economists as welfare enhancing.
Free trade tends, at times, to cause severe change and economic dislocation
in countries, but overall the result of free trade is a wealthier world. The trick
is to assert that what holds for goods, holds for money. Isn't money just an-
other good? Legally it is often treated as such.' Experience however, tells us
otherwise; capital, unlike goods, must be repaid.
Capital is only welfare enhancing if it is put to productive uses that gen-
erate returns in excess of the cost of the capital. The failure by Latin Amer-
ica to generate productive returns with the massive loans of the 1970s led to
the debt crisis of the 1980s. Likewise, the incapacity of the East Asian finan-
cial systems to channel the increased capital flows of the early and mid-
1990s into productive uses contributed significantly to the Asian crisis of
1997.' 5 The Asian economies were performing strongly before foreign capi-
tal flows into the region increased due to local capital market liberalisation,
surplus liquidity in the U.S., and the dissuasive effect the Mexican peso cri-
40. Russian European Center for Economic Policy, Russian Economic Trends: Monthly
Update, Sept. 4, 1998, at 5, at http://www.hhs.se/site/retupdate/sep98/September.pdf.
41. See Clifford S. Poirot, Jr., Financial Integration under Conditions of Chaotic Hys-
teresis: The Russian Financial Crisis of 1998 23(3) JOURNAL OF POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS
485, 500-03 (2001) (discussing the history of financial investment from 1995-1998).
42. Barry Eichengreen, Is Greater Private-Sector Burden Sharing Impossible? I (May
1999) (IMF Conference, Key Issues in Reform of the International Monetary and Financial
System) at http://emlab.berkeley.edulusers/eichengr/swoboda.pdf. There is no doubt that the
IMF's willingness to certify Russian fiscal progression added to the problem. Poirot, supra
note 41, at 502.
43. Aschinger, supra note 10, at 157 (arguing that moral hazard arising from expected
financial assistance from the IMF is a factor which may trigger a crisis); BARRY EICHENGREEN
& CHRISTOF RHL, THE BAIL-IN PROBLEM: SYSTEMATIC GOALS, AD Hoc MEANS 5 (Nat'l Bu-
rea of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7653. April 2000) at
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7653.
44. Firrz A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
COMPARATIVE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1992).
45. NOLAND ET AL., supra note 32, at 3, 8, 9.
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sis in late 1994 had on further capital flows to Latin America.46 It is therefore
not surprising that the increased capital flows of the 1990s ended up fueling
speculative bubbles in local stock and real estate markets.
The clearest lesson of the recent economic crises is that unfettered capi-
tal mobility is not necessarily welfare enhancing and not an unmitigated
good.'
II. IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The globalisation of capital markets leads to greater international portfo-
lio capital flows and "increases the vulnerability of emerging markets to cri-
ses." 8 In good times, these flows support growth in developing countries. In
bad times, they cause untold and appalling human suffering. The key lies in
who portfolio capital flows serve in good times and who they harm in bad
times.
The huge loans to Latin America of the 1970s brought "massive returns
to the rich."'49 However, when these loans had to be repaid in the 1980s they
were repaid by increasing taxes, reducing price supports on essential items
and cutting spending on public health care, public education and public in-
frastructure." The rich benefited from the loans, the common people and the
poor repaid them.
Likewise in Asia, the boom in portfolio capital flows and lending to the
region in the early to mid-1990s principally benefited the rich. The disloca-
tion and impoverishment brought on by the crisis in 1997 has, however,
fallen far more heavily on the shoulders of the common people and the
poor.5 With the exception of Indonesia, 2 Asia is recovering more quickly
46. See generally Ross P. Buckley, An Oft-Ignored Perspective on the Asian Economic
Crisis: The Role of Creditors and Investors, 15 BANK. & FIN. L. REv. 431 (2000).
47. See Nora Lustig, Crises and the Poor: Socially Responsible Macroeconomics, Presi-
dential Address to the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Latin American and Caribbean Eco-
nomic Association, Santiago, Chile (Oct. 22, 1999) at http://muse.jhu.edu/demo/eco
/1/1 .llustig.html.
48. BUSTELO ET AL., supra note 19, at 83.
49. A Survey; Latin America, ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 1993, at 25.
50. Between 1981 and 1986 real GDP per capita fell 10% in Mexico, 16% in Argentina
and 27% in Bolivia. Harold James, Deep Red-The International Debt Crisis and Its Histori-
cal Precedents, AMERICAN SCHOLAR, Summer 1987, at 331, 340. See also Joseph L.S. Abbey,
Growing out of Debt-The African Problem, in THIRD WORLD DEBT-MANAGING THE
CONSEQUENCES 159, 160 (Stephanie Griffith-Jones ed, 1989); JORGE G. CASTANEDA, UTOPIA
UNARMED 6-7 (1993); Jerry Dohnal, Structural Adjustment Programs: A Violation of Rights,
I AUSTRALIAN J. HUM. RTS. 57, 72-74,77 (1994); Duncan Green, Hidden Fist Hits the Buff-
ers, NEW INTERNATIONALIST, Oct. 1995, at 35; Wade Mansell, Legal Aspects of International
Debt 18 J.L. & Soc'Y 381, 388-90 (1991); Jdsus Silva-Herzog, The Costs for Latin America's
Development, in LATIN AMERICA'S DEBT CRISIS-ADJUSTING TO THE PAST OR PLANNING FOR
THE FUTURE? 33, 36 (Robert A. Pastor ed., 1987).
51. Crisis in Asia Spawns Millions of 'Newly Poor,' WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 1999, at B-5A
(According to World Bank's estimates, the Asian crisis has plunged many millions into pov-
erty).
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from its crisis than either Latin America or sub-Saharan Africa were able to
recover from the 1982 crisis. Nonetheless, the profound difference between
those who benefit from international capital, and those who pay for it, has
been maintained.
As Nora Lustig has written, "Macroeconomic crises, with the exception
of wars, are the single most important cause of large increases in... pov-
erty,"53 or in Charles Calomiris' words, "When the crisis has passed, the big
winners are the wealthy, politically influential risk takers, and the biggest
losers are the taxpayers in countries like Mexico or Indonesia."
This transferal of responsibility onto the poor is depressingly consistent.
After the debt crisis broke in 1982, the international banks required that all
loans, corporate and sovereign, be brought under the sovereign guarantee as
a way of facilitating rescheduling negotiations. Forcing governments to be-
come loan guarantors dramatically improved the security of the banks. The
largest banks benefited the most from this stratagem, as they held the highest
proportion of loans compared to the less creditworthy private sector. Unsur-
prisingly, these were the banks in charge of the rescheduling negotiations.55
In East Asia, in 1997, the great majority of the debt was held in the pri-
vate sector, but this did not stop the taxpayers in the debtor countries from
eventually bearing the costs of repaying the loans.-6 The IMF-led bailouts,
invariably described as bailouts of Indonesia, Thailand or Korea,' were, in
fact, long-term loans to these countries that had to be used to repay the short-
term creditors.58 These loans thus became debts of the nation and the bail-
outs were of the creditors, not the debtor nations at all.59 Indeed, even though
the IMF identified poor local prudential regulation and underdeveloped local
capital markets as two of the principal contributing causes to the crisis, the
IMF-orchestrated bailouts contained not one dollar to correct these weak-
nesses.
Such bail-outs must stop. In the Asian context, the bail-outs rewarded
the short-term creditors who had helped precipitate the crisis and did nothing
for the creditors who had advanced the type of debt that needs to be encour-
52. See Levinson, supra note 31, at 448-51. One year after the crisis, the ILO estimated
that an additional 20% of the Indonesian population would fall into poverty. The World Bank
further estimated that unemployment had tripled and real wages had decreased 40-60%.
Asia's Financial Crisis, supra note 31, at 12-13.
53. Lustig, supra note 47, at 2.
54. Charles W. Calomiris, The IMF's Imprudent Role as Lender of Last Resort, 17 CATO
J., Winter 1998, 275, 276-77.
55. Buckley, supra note 20, at 43.
56. See Eichengreen, supra note 42, at 1.
57. The IMF coordinated loans to these three countries totaling over $115 billion. Asia's
Financial Crisis, supra note 31, at 11.
58. Levinson, supra note 31, at 446.
59. Charles W. Calomiris & Allen H. Meltzer, Fixing the IMF, 56 NAT'L INTEREST,
Summer 1999, at 88.
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aged: long-term debt.' The bail-outs were very damaging for the poor of
Asia6"' and virtually guaranteed the creditor behaviour that in 1998 greatly
exacerbated Russia's crisis.
There are alternatives to the extremes of managed defaults on the one
hand, or bail-outs, on the other. The principal ones are a sovereign bank-
ruptcy court and a global lender of last resort.
A sovereign bankruptcy court would certainly be one way of allocating
losses more equitably between lenders and borrowers and of improving the
efficacy of the system.62 However, the establishment of such a court would
require a quite implausible surrender of national sovereignty. A nation's
courts would need to subordinate themselves to a global bankruptcy court,
much as Britain's courts are subordinate to the EU courts on matters of con-
current jurisdiction. There is simply no prospect of such a major step in the
foreseeable future. No existing supranational institution has the credibility
and broad basis of acceptance to undertake this role. There is no present
prospect of sufficient political will to support the creation of a global sover-
eign bankruptcy court.63
A global lender of last resort would, likewise, offer much to the stability
of the international financial system. Banking is inherently unstable, as it
usually involves banks holding illiquid assets (such as long-term mortgages)
and highly liquid liabilities (such as short-term deposits). A lender of last re-
sort (LoLR) commits in advance to lend funds to banks freely and quickly,
on good security and at high interest rates, in times of need." As noted by
Walter Bagehot in 1873, providing large amounts of funds quickly and
freely discourages runs on banks by depositors, because they are assured the
bank will have funds to meet their claims.' The requirements of good secu-
rity and high interest rates discourages banks from relying on the LoLR's
services and avoids the moral hazard that would otherwise flow from the
provision of such a service.66
60. In fact, countries such as Chile, Colombia and Slovenia encourage long-term debt by
placing capital controls on short-term inflows. CORSETrI ET AL., supra note 31, at 22 (Part II:
Policy Debate).
61. Richard Buckley argues that this was due to the IMF turning a currency crisis into an
economic crisis, which leads to large unemployment and an increase in prices. Asia's Finan-
cial Crisis, supra note 31, at 11.
62. See generally Steven L Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Re-
organization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 956, 962 (2000) (discussing the need for an in-
ternational bankruptcy court).
63. See KENNETH S. ROGOFF, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS FOR REDUCING GLOBAL
FINANCIAL INSTABILITY 16-17 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7265,
Jul. 1999) available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7265; Alan S. Blinder, Eight Steps to a
New Financial Order, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 50, 60 (1999).
64. WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 96-97
(Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 1962) (1873).
65. Id. at 97.
66. Id. Moral hazard arises whenever a financial actor does not bear, or anticipate bear-
ing, the full risk attached to its actions.
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There is no global LoLR. The IMF conditions its loans upon economic
reform in the recipient countries, so these commitments to lend are not un-
conditional, as is required to quell the fears of creditors and investors. Fur-
thermore, the IMF disburses these funds slowly over time as compliance is
established by the recipients, not disbursed quickly as required by Bagehot's
famed prescription.67 Finally, especially in the wake of the Asian economic
crisis that commenced in 1997, and the IMF's difficulties in securing sub-
scriptions from some member countries, the IMF simply does not have re-
sources of the magnitude required to serve as a credible LoLR to sovereign
entities.
There is, however, a clear need for a global LoLR. No domestic banking
system would be stable without such a backstop, so it comes as no surprise
that the international banking system is not particularly stable. The imple-
mentation challenges with an international LoLR includes the difficulty of
ensuring it lends only on adequate enforceable security, so as to limit moral
hazard, and the difficulty of providing it with the required resources.68
The sovereignty fears should be far less with a LoLR than with a global
bankruptcy court, and should not prove insurmountable. After all, the LoLR
would merely be serving as a lender to a troubled country, and its existence
would not require any reduction in the freedom to act of the country or its
judicial system.
Providing adequate security, however, poses very real difficulties. Oil
exporting nations, such as Mexico, can charge future oil revenues to serve as
collateral for such a facility. Non-oil exporters, however, may well lack ade-
quate realisable security on the scale required and it may be necessary to
structure some sort of escrow arrangement. Under such an escrow agree-
ment, once the LoLR makes a loan, a set proportion of the nation's subse-
quent export earnings would be redirected to a trusted third party to serve as
security for the loans.
Nonetheless, the only structural change to the international financial ar-
chitecture with any prospect of realisation is that of a global LoLR. This is
certainly an end worth working towards. Realistically, it is also an end that is
many, many years away. In the meantime, we need to reconceptualise the
role of creditors and debtors in the current international financial system.
III. CONCLUSION
The role of creditors and investors in the creation of excessive indebted-
ness is widely overlooked. This is not surprising. Most commentators on the
international financial system, academic and journalistic, are from developed
countries and, as a result, they incline towards the perspective of the credi-
67. ROGOFF, supra note 63, at 15 ("Lend freely, to temporarily illiquid but solvent banks,
a penalty rates and using collateral that would be good under non-crisis circumstances" citing
Bagehot (1873)).
68. ROGOFF, supra note 63, at 9, 14.
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tors and investors. It is this perspective that tends to dominate the national
debate on these matters. However, it is time for a new framework for under-
standing responsibility in international lending and investment.
As it is, our modem financial system fails utterly to protect the innocent
bystanders. Borrowers should repay their debts, even when it is painful to do
so. Banks and investors who make errors should suffer the consequences.
The common people of debtor nations should not bear the primary burden of
financial crises, yet, almost invariably, they do.
Creditors and investors who make poor lending or investment decisions
in the domestic context suffer the consequences. The ultimate sanction of
bankruptcy provides a way out from under crippling debt for the debtor and
typically results in substantial losses for creditors of, and investors in, the
debtor. However, there is no equivalent to bankruptcy protection for sover-
eign debtors and, as we have considered, the development of a global sover-
eign bankruptcy court is highly unlikely. Indeed, it is almost as if the protec-
tion of bankruptcy has been replaced in the international context by a
presumption that bad loans and bad investments are entirely the debtors'
fault. This is a convenient fiction for international banks and investors, noth-
ing more. However, it is a fiction with severe consequences.
The IMF bail-outs of the Asian debtors were made available to repay
short-term bank debt. A default on such debt would have avoided the severe
moral hazard occasioned by this use of the bail-out funds which, inciden-
tally, contributed directly to the market extending excessive credit to Russia
in late 1997 and early 1998, thus leading to Russia's crisis in August 1998.69
Allowing a default on this debt would also have freed these bail-out funds to
be used to recapitalise the local banks, improve the local financial systems
and stimulate the local economies." To use these funds to, in effect, bail out
the international banks rather than the debtors is only defensible in a frame-
work of moral responsibility that holds the creditors blameless. Yet bad
loans usually involve errors of judgment by both parties and the conse-
quences of those errors should be shared. This is especially so as the burdens
on the debtors usually fall on those least able to bear them-the poor and
disadvantaged.7'
The repayment process in times of crisis is generally directed and or-
chestrated by the IMF. In Latin America and Africa in the 1980s, the IMF's
69. Asia's Financial Crisis, supra note 31, at 14-15.
70. HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS,
POLICY, AND REGULATION 1248 (7th ed. 2000).
71. In Latin America, IMF structural adjustment programs tended to increase disparities
in wealth. DUNCAN GREEN, SILENT REvOLUTION-THE RISE OF MARKET ECONOMICS IN LATIN
AMERICA 92 (1995). SAPs meant the disadvantaged suffered most. Harold James, supra note
50 at 340; but brought "magnificent returns to the rich" A Survey: Latin America, supra note
49, at 25. In one commentator's words, "[t]he austerity program the Mexican government put
in place when its economy faltered was a devastating blow to the country's working poor, but
the big investors emerged largely unscathed." David E. Sanger, Ideas & Trends; Maybe a
Bankrupt Nation Isn't the Worst Thing in the World, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1997, § 4, at 6.
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structural adjustment programs (SAPs) infringed upon numerous basic hu-
man rights." After initially advocating and requiring a fiscal austerity that
deepened the Asian crisis, the IMF all but admitted its initial stance was
wrong, and agreed to reflationary policies in many of the countries that have
aided the region in its recovery from the crisis. Nonetheless, there are chil-
dren today in Indonesia, Korea and Thailand who are hungry or have to
work, rather than attend school, because of the impoverishment and eco-
nomic dislocation brought about by the Asian crisis,73 a crisis to which inter-
national capital flows contributed significantly.
It is time for a new allocation of responsibility in international lending
that sees losses shared more evenly between creditors and debtors in times of
trouble. We have to move beyond the assumption, so very convenient for the
international financial community, that excessive capital flows to developing
countries are always cases of excessive borrowing and never of excessive
lending. Losses from poor lending decisions for such loans must be allowed
to fall on the creditors, as they do for domestic loans. This one change of the
international financial architecture that is realistically achievable in the short
to medium term. Allowing creditors to bear the consequences of their lend-
ing decisions will minimise the great injustice inherent in the current alloca-
tion of responsibility in the international financial system. In addition, by
minimising moral hazard and focusing creditor's minds more sharply upon
their lending decisions, this change will serve to make the international fi-
nancial system more stable and less crisis prone.
72. See Dohnal, supra note 50, at 57 (describing SAPs as a violation of economic human
rights); Levinson, supra note 31, at 446-48 (discussing the impact of SAPs on Indonesia).
73. Bill Powell, The Great Betrayal, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 3, 1998, at 21 (Atlantic ed.) (ar-
guing that the toll of Asia's economic crisis can be measured in "soaring joblessness, deepen-
ing poverty and increasing desperation"). See also Levinson, supra note 31, at 452-56.
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